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1 Introduction
The longstanding classical liberal view in the international relations literature holds that
globalization and/or trade liberalization promotes global peace (e.g., Polachek, 1980). Specif-
ically, to the extent that war between nations disrupts trade between them as Glick and
Taylor’s (2010) evidence suggests, greater economic interdependence increases the costs of
war and thus should decrease the likelihood of its onset. This view finds some support
empirically; overall, however, the evidence is mixed.1 Moreover, the particular mechanisms
underlying this link are not fully understood. Existing theoretical work shows that whether
the presence of trading opportunities makes conflict more or less severe (as measured by
resources diverted to the military) depends on a number of factors that drive trade and its
possible gains, including the source of comparative advantage and the countries’ relative
sizes.2 Even less understood are how different methods of conflict resolution between na-
tions, who possibly trade with each other, affect the potential gains they could realize by
settling their differences peacefully.
An obvious advantage of not resorting to war, in addition to leaving open the possibility
of trade, is that it allows the two sides to avoid war’s destructive effects on productive
resources. A related but perhaps less obvious advantage derives from the anticipation that
the dispute will be resolved peacefully—namely, to free up resources that otherwise would
have to be devoted to building one’s military, thereby leaving more for production and trade.
In the context of international relations where contracting between countries is incomplete,
the magnitude of this benefit would be moderated by the countries’ perception that building
one’s military force in advance of their negotiations, even if not deployed, is necessary to
improve one’s bargaining position and, thus, obtain a better “deal.” If building military force
is seen as being more important this way, the possible net gains from a peaceful settlement
are smaller; and, conversely, if building such force is seen as being relatively unimportant,
the possible net gains are larger. Hence, the conventions or norms of negotiation that spell
out how the two sides of a dispute reach an agreement matter for determining the gains
that can be realized under a peaceful settlement over war.3
In this paper, we explore how such norms interact with the gains from trade possible
under peaceful settlement. More specifically, based on a simplified version of the model
1While Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999), for example, present evidence that economic interdependence
between two nations is negatively related to the likelihood of war breaking out between them, Barbieri (1996,
2002) finds no significant relation between trade and war. See Copeland (2015) for a survey of alternative
views and empirical evidence regarding trade and war found in the international relations literature.
2See, for example, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001), Garfinkel et al. (2015), and Garfinkel and Syropoulos
(2017a). Also, see Bonfatti and O’Rourke (2017) who study how increasing trade dependence for two
adversarial countries with the rest of the world can influence the likelihood of a preemptive war.
3See, for example, Anbarci et al. (2002). Also, see Garfinkel et al. (2012), who analyze how norms and
the more formal institutions of governance that help define and enforce property rights matter jointly in
determining the possible gains from settlement.
presented in Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2017b) of resource disputes and trade between two
countries, we compare the efficiency properties of three different rules of division under set-
tlement. These rules correspond to three prominent bargaining solutions—namely, splitting
the surplus, equal sacrifice and Nash bargaining.4 They differ in terms of the role assigned
to the threat points or payoffs under war, as defined by the quantity “arms” or “guns”
brought by each side to the negotiation table. Specifically, the split-the-surplus solution
involves an equal division of the difference between the sum of the two sides’ payoffs under
the agreement and the sum of their threat-point payoffs; the equal sacrifice solution requires
that each side’s sacrifice in payoffs, defined as the difference between one’s maximum fea-
sible payoff (or ideal payoff) and the payoff under the agreed upon division, be equalized;
and, the Nash bargaining solution involves maximizing the product the two sides’ surpluses
realized under the agreement relative to their respective threat points. The different roles
assigned to the threat points mean that the rules induce different incentives for arming in
anticipation of settlement, which imply different quantities of the resource remaining for
production and trade. Therefore, like Anbarci et al. (2002), we find the relative efficiency of
the rules depends, at least in part, on their relative sensitivity to the threat points or payoffs
under war. As in that paper, variation in such sensitivity across rules can be interpreted
as variation in the norms against threats, with greater sensitivity implying weaker norms
against threats, greater equilibrium arming and thus greater inefficiency.
Moving beyond Anbarci et al. (2002), however, we find that the shape and size of the
bargaining set also depend on the potential gains from trade.5 If the gains from trade are
large, then at least one of the division rules considered (either that which follows from the
equal sacrifice solution or that which follows from split the surplus solution) can support
peace with no arming at all; and, in this case, Nash bargaining, which always induces
positive arming, is dominated by the other bargaining protocols. However, if the gains from
trade are sufficiently small, then all of the bargaining solutions considered involve strictly
positive arming; in this case, equal sacrifice—the solution concept that relies least on the
disagreement payoffs—is Pareto dominant.
How do the payoffs under peaceful settlement compare with the payoffs under conflict?
Under the premise of the classical liberal hypothesis that war disrupts trade, each of the rules
considered under peaceful settlement delivers a higher payoff than the payoff under war.
What’s more, whether the gains from trade are large or small, each of the rules considered
supports peaceful settlement as the unique equilibrium outcome. Put differently, provided
4We follow Anbarci et al. (2002) in studying the split-the-surplus and equal sacrifice solutions; but,
whereas we also consider the Nash bargaining solution, they consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
5Martin et al. (2008) explore how trade opportunities between the two contending countries alone and
between each country and others can influence the effectiveness of bargaining to avoid war under uncertainty,
but they do not consider explicitly the resource costs involved.
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that there are some gains from trade, war is not a possible equilibrium outcome.6
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present a simple
one-period model of conflict and trade, along with a preliminary analysis of outcomes and
payoffs under war and under peaceful settlement for any division rule considered and given
the gun choices made by each side of conflict. In Section 3, we turn to study each of the
rules of division implied by the three bargaining solutions and derive our central findings.
Section 4 offers concluding remarks, including possible extensions of the analysis. Technical
details are relegated to the Appendix.
2 A Simple Model of Conflict and Trade
Consider an environment in which each of two agents/countries, i = 1, 2, is endowed with Ri
units of a productive resource such as land, oil or water. Once held securely, this resource
can be used to produce (possibly tradable) commodities. However, initial claims are not
secure. Each agent invests Gi units of Ri in a non-contractible and irreversible influence
activity called “arming” (or “guns” for short) to contest the remaining resource jointly held
by both: X¯ ≡∑i (Ri −Gi).
Their competing claims over X¯, given their prior arming choices, can be resolved in one of
two ways: through a winner-take-all contest (“war”) or through bargaining and negotiation
(“peaceful settlement”). Under war which precludes trade, each agent’s probability of
winning the contest depends on the agents’ relative arming.7 Under peaceful settlement,
the agents divide X¯ on the basis of some predetermined bargaining solution concept. Once
X¯ is divided and the agents produce their goods, they engage in free trade with each other.
A distinguishing feature of peaceful settlement in this setting is that it is conducted under
the threat of war. That is to say, if the two agents reach an impasse in their negotiations, war
breaks out, with each agent’s probability of winning all of X¯ depending on his/her relative
guns. As will become evident, arming provides, through its impact on the disagreement or
war payoffs, agents with leverage in their negotiations. But, by diverting resources away
from useful production, arming also affects (i) the size of the “prize” and (ii) the trade-off in
payoffs along the payoff possibility frontier. To the extent that division rules differ in their
6In Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2017b), we study in a dynamic setting the countries’ choices of both
arming and whether to settle peacefully or go to war. As discussed in some detail below, we find that, war
can emerge as the perfectly coalition-proof equilibrium, despite its effect to preclude mutually advantageous
trade. The difference in results is due to commitment problems that have been analyzed by others in different
dynamic settings without trade (e.g., Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000; McBride and Skaperdas, 2014). While
the analysis in the one-period setting of the present paper abstracts from these problems, it does bring to
light the importance of considering alternative rules of division in assessing the prospects of peace in the
presence of economic interdependence when commitment problems are relevant.
7To highlight the salience of trade, we abstract from war’s destructive effects. This assumption and our
assumption that war precludes trade could be relaxed, but at a cost of added analytical complexity.
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reliance on the just noted dimensions of the bargaining problem, their efficiency properties
could differ as well. The question is: How?
2.1 Production and Trade for Given Effective Endowments
We now turn to production and trade that are important for characterizing the bargaining
set and thus for answering the question above. Let the share of X¯ obtained by agent i under
peaceful settlement based on the solution concept h ∈ {ss, es, nb} be denoted by λih, where
“ss” is identified with splitting the surplus, “es” with equal sacrifice, and “nb” with Nash
bargaining. Furthermore, let Zi ≡ λiX¯ be agent i’s effective endowment.8 We assume for
simplicity that Zi can be used to produce, on a one-to-one basis, a nationally differentiated
and potentially tradable commodity. We interpret this commodity as an intermediate input
to the production of a final consumption good, say “butter.”9
To capture the gains from trade in a compact and intuitive way, we assume the produc-
tion function for butter takes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form. Production
by agent i is given by
F i = F
(
Di1, D
i
2
)
=
[(
Di1
)σ−1
σ +
(
Di2
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
where Dij denotes the quantity of intermediate input j ∈ {1, 2} demanded by agent i
∈ {1, 2}, and σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate
inputs. The specification in (1), which is symmetric, increasing, linearly homogeneous, and
(provided σ < ∞) strictly concave in its arguments, reflects the benefit of employing a
greater variety of distinct inputs in production, analogous to the “love of variety” exhibited
by Dixit-Stiglitz preferences; and, this benefit, which can be interpreted as the gains from
trade, increases as the two intermediate goods become more distinct (i.e., as σ (> 1) falls).10
Whether we consider trade or autarky, agent i chooses the allocation of his effective
endowment Zi to maximize his output and thus consumption of butter F i shown in (1). Of
course, the constraints relevant for that choice depend on whether the two agents trade or
8We will describe the three bargaining protocols shortly. Until then, we omit the subscript associated
with division h to avoid notational clutter.
9Formally, the assumed structure of production and trade is consistent with the Armington (1969) model.
The analysis could be extended to allow for the possibility of Ricardian type of trade (where each agent
i = 1, 2 can produce both intermediate goods j = 1, 2, but has a comparative advantage in one, say good
j = i) without changing our results qualitatively. By the same token, our assumption that all of the residual
resource Ri − Gi held by each agent is subject to dispute could be relaxed to allow for some (imperfect)
degree of security. We have confirmed that, if the structure of comparative advantage and the degree of
resource insecurity are symmetric, the analysis could be extended in these two ways simultaneously without
changing the results qualitatively.
10The restriction that σ > 1 is imposed to ensure that output under autarky (using one input only) is
well-defined and strictly positive. Otherwise, the threat-point payoff would equal zero and there would be
no arming under any of the bargaining protocols considered.
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not. Under autarky, each agent i is forced to rely solely on his own productive capabilities;
thus, Dij = 0 for i 6= j and F i = F (·) = Zi in this case.
The case of free trade is a bit more involved. Let Y i, pij and γ
i
j respectively denote agent
i’s income, price and expenditure share on good j. One can verify that γij ≡ (pij/P i)1−σ,
where P i ≡ [∑j(pij)1−σ] 11−σ , and furthermore that Dij = γijY i/pij , where Y i = piiZi. Now let
the “world” price of good j be denoted by pij . Our assumption of free trade implies p
i
j = pij
for each agent i = 1, 2 and both goods j = 1, 2. Naturally, relative prices are endogenously
determined. By Walras’ Law, these prices follow from the world market-clearing condition
pijD
i
j = piiD
j
i (i 6= j), and satisfy
piT ≡ pij/pii =
(
Zi/Zj
)1/σ
=
(
λi/λj
)1/σ
, (2)
where the far right expression was obtained from the definition Zi ≡ λiX¯.
2.2 Payoffs under Peaceful Settlement
To derive an expression for agent i’s payoff function under trade presuming peaceful nego-
tiations are successful (V i = F i), we combine (2) and the relations noted above with (1) to
obtain, after simplification,
V i ≡ V i (λi, Gi, Gj) = viX¯, (3)
where
vi
(
λi
) ≡ λi [1 + (λi/λj) 1−σσ ] 1σ−1 =
 (λi)σ−1σ
(λi)
σ−1
σ + (λj)
σ−1
σ
F (λi, λj) . (4)
The far right expression in (4) reveals that the payoff to agent i, per unit of the contested
resource X¯, coincides with his competitive share of the output that would be produced in
an integrated competitive economy.11 That is to say, each agent is rewarded with the value
of his marginal product times the quantity of the resource he controls.
Since as one can easily confirm arg maxλi F (λ
i, λj) = 12 and v
i + vj = F (λi, λj), each
agent would be willing to sacrifice some efficiency (i.e., a reduction in F (λi, λj)) in return
for a larger share λi of the contested resource. It is straightforward to verify that, provided
the two intermediate inputs are distinct (i.e., σ < ∞), vi is strictly concave in λi, that
λiT ≡ arg maxλi vi ∈ (12 , 1) and that limσ→1 λiT = 12 , while limσ→∞ λiT = 1.12 Clearly, the
11The expression inside the square brackets is the elasticity of butter production with respect to agent i’s
input.
12In the Appendix (see the proof of Lemma 2), we prove viλiλi < 0. Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2017b)
establish these properties hold under more general circumstances, including the presence of “iceberg” type
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elasticity of substitution σ plays a key role in the characterization of the critical values of
λi for payoffs under trade. Indeed, as we will see shortly, the value of σ figures prominently
in the determination of the bargaining set and the ranking of payoffs that the division rules
h ∈ {ss, es, nb} deliver.
2.3 Payoffs under War
Turning to war, let φi
(
Gi, Gj
)
be the probability that agent i (6= j) wins. For simplicity,
we assume the ratio form of the conflict technology:
φi
(
Gi, Gj
)
=
{
Gi
Gi+Gj
, if Gi +Gj > 0
1
2 , if G
i +Gj = 0.
(5)
According to this specification, agent i’s winning probability is increasing in his own guns
Gi, decreasing in his rival’s guns Gj and is symmetric so that φi = φj = 12 when G
i = Gj .13
Recall that, since there is no trade under war, the expression in (1) implies that produc-
tion depends linearly on the agent’s own effective endowment: F i = Zi. Now let ZW ≡ X¯
denote the effective endowment enjoyed by the winner of the conflict and ZL = 0 denote the
loser’s effective endowment. Then, we can write agent i’s expected payoff under conflict,
denoted by U i, as
U i ≡ U i (Gi, Gj) = φiZiW + (1− φi)ZiL = φiX¯. (6)
For future reference, define ui ≡ φi, so that ui + uj = 1 and U i = uiX¯. As one can
confirm, by differentiating the far right expression in (6) with respect to Gi, recalling X¯ =∑
i(R
i−Gi), using (5) and examining the resulting first-order conditions (FOCs), agent i’s
best response to agent j’s choice Gj , Bic(G
j), is given by
Bic(G
j) = max
[
Ri,
√
Gj(Ri +Rj)−Gj
]
, (7)
which implies a symmetric equilibrium under war, Gic = Gc =
1
4(R
i +Rj) for i = 1, 2, when
neither agent is resource constrained in his arming choice.14
trade costs due to geographic trade barriers.
13See Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer (1989) and Skaperdas (1996) for analyses and discussions of this form.
14More precisely, the equilibrium in arming under war is symmetric provided that initial resources, R1
and R2, are not too unevenly distributed across agents. Letting R¯ = R1 +R2, this condition can be written
as Ri ∈ [ 1
4
R¯, 3
4
R¯) for i = 1, 2.
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2.4 A Comparison of Payoffs for Given Guns
To understand the nature of the bargaining protocols we wish to study—and, in particular,
the way in which they condition arming incentives—it helps to fix guns at some level and ask
how the per unit of X¯ payoff vectors, (vi, vj) under settlement and (ui, uj) under conflict,
compare. As suggested earlier, the elasticity of substitution σ is a crucial parameter here.
Fig. 1 illustrates the dependence of the above payoffs (per unit of X¯) along the payoff
possibility frontier (PPF) for several values of σ. The black, solid-line segment that connects
point 1 on the two axes depicts the possible payoff values under conflict, ui. Points along this
schedule define the agents’ disagreement payoffs which, of course, depend on their relative
arming. The midpoint of this schedule depicts the combination of the agents’ expected
payoffs under war that arises when G1 = G2. In the extreme case, where σ →∞ such that
the intermediate tradables are perfect substitutes, the PPF for (vi, vj) coincides with the
u1 + u2 = 1 frontier; in this special case, trade and, thus, settlement are pointless.
Now suppose σ is finite, which implies as noted earlier that vi (·) is strictly concave in
λi. Then, for any feasible pair of guns
(
Gi, Gj
)
, there exist many combinations of shares,
λi and λj = 1 − λi, for which both agents are weakly better off under settlement (vi ≥ ui
for i = 1, 2), and at least one agent is strictly better off (vi > ui). The collection of such
combinations gives us the bargaining set. Fig. 1 depicts this set in the symmetric case
where Gi = Gj , for alternative (finite) values of σ.15 Importantly, the lower is the value of
σ (> 1) and thus the greater are the possible gains from trade, the larger are the potential
gains from settlement and thus the larger is the size of the bargaining set. The particular
rule of division used by the two agents, then, pins down a point on the relevant PPF. For
example, a division of the contested resource according to φi given Gi = Gj would pick
the (vi, vj) combination where the 45◦ line intersects the relevant PPF (see Fig. 1). More
generally, the strict concavity of vi (·) implies, again for given (Gi, Gj), the two sides always
find it appealing to settle their disputes peacefully by dividing the resource X¯ according to
φi instead of initiating war and winning all of X¯ with probability φi.
But, while the division of the resource according to φi is one possibility, other division
rules, such as the ones noted earlier, could be considered. To prepare the groundwork for
this analysis, we start with the definition of an agent’s “ideal” payoff. Let λ˜j denote the
smallest share of the contested resource that agent j would be willing to accept in a peaceful
settlement. This share satisfies
v˜j ≡ vj(λ˜j) = uj (·) , (8)
15Note that, when G1 > G2 (G1 < G2), the most southwest point of each bargaining set (given σ > 1)
shown in the figure moves right (left) along the u1 + u2 = 1 frontier.
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with uj = φj defined in (5) and vj defined in (4). This share for agent j would leave agent
i with a share
˜˜
λ
i
= 1− λ˜j that generates a payoff
˜˜vi ≡ vi(˜˜λi). (9)
This payoff combination is illustrated in Fig. 1, assuming Gi = Gj and σ = 3, at point
E. However, depending on the degree of substitutability between the two inputs (σ), λiT ≡
arg maxλi v
i could be less than
˜˜
λ
i
, in which case agent i would obtain a higher payoff by
accepting a smaller share of the contested resource—i.e., vi(λiT ) > v
i(
˜˜
λ
i
)—which his rival
would gladly accept. This reasoning suggests that an agent’s “ideal” payoff in the bargaining
set (denoted by wi) can be defined as
wi = max
[
vi(
˜˜
λ
i
), vi
(
λiT
)]
. (10)
The next lemma builds on these ideas to characterize some important properties of the
payoffs vi and wi as they depend on the potential gains from trade:
Lemma 1 Under settlement, agent i’s payoff vi and ideal payoff wi for i = 1, 2 satisfy the
following relationships:
(a) If σ Q 2, then vi(12) R vi (1).
(b) Suppose G1 = G2 = G. Then, wi = vi
(
λiT
)
for σ ≤ 2 and wi = vi(˜˜λi) for σ ≥ 2.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Part (a) suggests a potential trade-off between ownership and trade. In particular, it es-
tablishes that, when the gains from trade are sufficiently large (σ < 2), both agents prefer
to share the disputed resource equally and then engage in trade over controlling the entire
resource in which case trade would not be possible. Otherwise (when σ ≥ 2), both agents
prefer to control the entire resource.16 Part (b) shows that, when both agents produce iden-
tical quantities of guns and the gains from trade are relatively large (σ ≤ 2), each agent’s
ideal payoff coincides with the payoff he would enjoy if he were free to choose the division
of X¯ solely on the basis of self interest, as indicated by λiT . By contrast, when σ ≥ 2, an
agent’s ideal payoff depends on the disagreement payoffs, as indicated by
˜˜
λ
i
that gives his
rival the lowest acceptable payoff. Fig. 1 illustrates these points.
16Note that this claim does not mean that either agent prefers war in this case.
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3 Division Rules and Their Relative Efficiency
We now study the efficiency properties of three division rules generated by the three bar-
gaining protocols identified earlier—namely, the split-the-surplus (ss), equal sacrifice (es)
and Nash bargaining (nb) solutions. After formally defining these rules, we compare their
implications for arming and payoffs and ultimately for the relative appeal of peace. Hence-
forth, we adopt the assumption of symmetry across agents/countries:
Symmetry: Ri = R for i = 1, 2. (S)
Under this assumption, equilibrium spending under peaceful settlement for any rule h ∈
{ss, es, nb} will be symmetric.
As noted earlier, λih (for i = 1, 2 and h ∈ {ss, es, nb}) denotes the share of the common
pool obtained by agent i under solution h. We similarly index payoffs vih = v
i
(
λih
)
and
V ih = V
i
(
λih
)
(= vihX¯). Keeping guns (and thus X¯) fixed in the background, define the
following functional relationships:
Φ ≡ Φ (λi, Gi, Gj) = vj − uj
vi − ui (11a)
Ψ ≡ Ψ (λi, Gi, Gj) = wj − vj
wi − vi (11b)
Ω ≡ Ω(λi) = −v
j
λj
vi
λi
, (11c)
for i 6= j = 1, 2, where we use the convention that vi
λi
≡ dvi/dλi−dvi/dλj (since λj = 1−λi).
Then, the solution concepts noted above can be defined as follows:
Φ
(
λi, Gi, Gj
)
= 1 ⇒ v
j(λjss)− uj
vi (λiss)− ui
= 1 (12a)
Ψ
(
λi, Gi, Gj
)
= 1 ⇒ w
j − vj(λjes)
wi − vi (λies)
= 1 (12b)
Φ
(
λi, Gi, Gj
)
+ Ω
(
λi
)
= 0 ⇒
vj
(
λjnb
)
− uj
vi
(
λinb
)− ui = v
j
λj
(
λjnb
)
vi
λi
(
λinb
) . (12c)
Since λjh = 1 − λih, the shares λih induced by the various solution concepts are implicitly
defined by the above equations.
These concepts can be visualized with the help of the two panels in Fig. 2, drawn for
given arms with G1 > G2.17 In both panels, the combination of payoffs v1h and v
2
h under
17Also, keep in mind that the scale for panel (b) is larger than that for panel (a) to allow for a clearer
illustration of the differences in the solutions h ∈ {ss, es, nb} when σ > 2.
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each of the solutions considered h ∈ {ss, es, nb} lie on the PPF. The ideal payoff for agent 1
w1 is defined by λ1T in panel (a) where σ < 2 and is defined by
˜˜
λ
1
in panel (b) where σ > 2.
For the rule generated by ss, λiss is implicitly defined (by (12a)) as point ss in the panels,
because Φ = 1 holds along the 45◦ line going through the
(
u1, u2
)
point of disagreement
payoffs. Similarly, the λies share is defined (by (12b)) as point es in both panels, because
Ψ = 1 holds along the 45◦ line going through the point of ideal payoffs
(
w1, w2
)
. Finally,
the Nash bargaining solution satisfies λinb = arg maxλi
[
vi
(
λi
)− ui)] [vj (λj)− uj]. The
expression in (12c) represents the FOC to this problem.
It is important to emphasize that changes in guns do not directly affect payoffs vih.
However, changes in guns can affect shares (and thus the payoffs vih) through their impact
on the disagreement payoffs
(
ui, uj
)
. In the case of equal sacrifice, the effect of guns on
λies is transmitted through their impact on the ideal payoffs which, as we saw earlier, can
depend on guns indirectly (though not always), again through the disagreement payoffs.
To identify the impact of guns on payoffs we partially differentiate V ih = v
i
hX¯ with
respect to Gi, accounting for the effect on the resource that remains, X¯:
∂V ih/∂G
i = X¯
(
∂vih
∂λih
)(
∂λih/∂G
i
)− vih, i = 1, 2 and h ∈ {ss, es, nb}. (13)
The first term represents the indirect effect of an additional gun on agent i’s payoff through
its effect on the division rule; the second term captures the constant marginal cost as an
additional gun implies a smaller quantity of the resource X¯ to divide. It should now be
evident that the sensitivity ∂λih/∂G
i of an agent’s share to his guns is central to his arming
decision.
The next lemma describes this sensitivity across the three solution concepts:
Lemma 2 Assume (S) and suppose that λih responds to changes in G
i (i = 1, 2 and h
∈ {ss, es, nb}). Then, 0 < ∂λies/∂Gi < ∂λinb/∂Gi < ∂λiss/∂Gi, where each partial derivative
is evaluated at an identical quantity of arms Gi = Gj = G.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Maintaining (momentarily) a focus on situations where agents’ shares λih respond to changes
in arming, Lemma 2 points out that, under conditions of symmetry, equal sacrifice gives rise
to a division that is least sensitive to an agent’s arms, whereas splitting the surplus gives
rise to a division that is most sensitive to an agent’s arms; the sensitivity of the division to
an agent’s arms under Nash bargaining lies in the middle. Although Anbarci et al. (2002)
do not consider Nash bargaining, they find a similar ranking for the equal sacrifice and split-
the-surplus solutions in a different setting. But, the more important point here is this: the
bargaining solution that relies least (most) on the threat-point payoffs corresponds precisely
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to the division that is least (most) sensitive to changes in arming. Interestingly, the Nash
bargaining solution lies in the middle of this ranking because, even though it relies on the
disagreement payoffs, this reliance is tempered by its dependence on the slope of the PPF
and the sensitivity of that slope to arming.
The above discussion raises the question of whether, under our assumption of symmetry,
each of the bargaining solutions h ∈ {ss, es, nb} necessarily implies a rule of division λih
that depends positively on agent i’s arming given the rival’s arming. As we now argue, the
presence or absence of such an influence of guns depends on the magnitude of the gains
from trade (which depends negatively on σ > 1) as well the bargaining solution considered.
Proposition 1 (Symmetric equilibria.) Assume (S), let Gh denote the representative
agent’s guns in the symmetric equilibria under each bargaining solution h ∈ {ss, es, nb},
and define A ≡ 2 1σ−1 (σ−1)σ (> 0) and B ≡ 2
1
σ−1−1
σ−1 (> 0). Then,
(a) under the split-the-surplus protocol, equilibrium arming satisfies Gss = 0 and/or
Gss = R/
[
1 + σσ−1A
]
:
(i) if σ ∈ [112 , 2], there exist two equilibria one of which exhibits no arming;
(ii) if σ ∈ (1, 112) ∪ (2,∞), there exists a unique equilibrium with positive arming.
(b) under the equal sacrifice and Nash bargaining protocols, there exist unique equilibria
such that
(i) Ges = 0 for σ ∈ (1, 2], while Ges > 0 for σ ∈ (2,∞);
(ii) Gnb = R/
[
1 + σσ−1(A+B)
]
for σ ∈ (1,∞).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Four ideas stand out in connection with Proposition 1. First, under the split-the-surplus so-
lution and depending on the size of the gains from trade, two types of (symmetric) equilibria
can arise: one with and another without arming. As explained in Garfinkel and Syropoulos
(2017b), this possibility arises in a more general setting and can be explained as follows.
For all σ ∈ (1,∞], given the rival’s arming is strictly positive, each agent i has a strictly
positive incentive to arm as well under the split-the-surplus solution. However, when σ < 2,
the split-the-surplus rule allocates a strictly positive share of the resource to the rival even
when he does not arm and agent i does. Now suppose that σ is marginally below 2 and
Gj = 0. Agent i can choose Gi = ε (an infinitesimal quantity) and obtain a share close
to 1 or choose Gi = 0 and obtain half of X¯. By Lemma 1(a), agent i prefers the latter.
Nevertheless, as σ falls, the relative appeal of choosing Gi = 0 when Gj = 0 eventually
diminishes and approaches zero as σ approaches 32 , thereby undermining the stability of
Gss = 0 for σ ∈ (1, 32).18 Second, the symmetric equilibria under the equal sacrifice and
18Since the no-arming equilibrium Pareto dominates the arming equilibrium, when σ ∈ ( 3
2
, 2) such that
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Nash bargaining solutions are unique. The reason is that these solutions, unlike the split-
the-surplus solution, do not set in motion a process that leads to no arming. Third, the
equilibrium under Nash bargaining always involves a positive quantity of guns. In contrast,
the equilibrium under equal sacrifice involves no arming when σ ≤ 2 and positive arming
when σ > 2. The reason Gnb > 0 is because the solution is always at a negatively sloped
portion of the PPF and its implementation requires each agent to produce some guns. The
reason Ges = 0 for σ ≤ 2 is because in this case agents’ ideal payoffs are independent of
the disagreement payoffs, as emphasized in part (b) of Lemma 1, and, consequently, are
invariant to changes in arms. By contrast, when σ > 2, Ges > 0 because agents’ ideal
payoffs depend on
(
u1, u2
)
and thus on arming decisions. Finally, in interior equilibria, the
quantity of arms under splitting the surplus is larger than that under Nash bargaining. This
ranking, which can be deduced from the equilibrium quantities described in the proposition,
is driven by the ranking of the sensitivities of shares detailed in Lemma 2.
The next proposition, which follows from Proposition 1 with Lemmas 1 and 2, provides
a more precise statement of these ideas.
Proposition 2 (Arming Comparisons.) Under assumption (S), the equilibrium quantities
of guns associated with the bargaining solutions h ∈ {ss, es, nb} can be compared as follows:
(a) If σ ∈ (1, 112), then Ges = 0 < Gnb < Gss.
(b) If σ ∈ (112 , 2], then Ges = Gss = 0 < Gnb or Ges = 0 < Gnb < Gss.
(c) If σ ∈ (2,∞), then 0 < Ges < Gnb < Gss.
The horizontal axis in Fig. 3 plots the equilibrium level of arming associated with each
solution concept under peaceful settlement and that under war. Panel (a) considers a case
where σ ∈ (112 , 2] (as in part (b) of the proposition), and panel (b) considers a case where
σ > 2 (as in part (c)). One can also verify easily, as shown in the figure, peaceful settlement
with any rule h ∈ {ss, es, nb} induces lower equilibrium arming than what emerges under
conflict for all σ ∈ (1,∞) under assumption (S).19
It is worthwhile pointing out how the results in Proposition 2 compare with the results
in Anbarci et al. (2002). As suggested earlier in connection to Lemma 2, our finding, that
for all σ ∈ (1,∞) equilibrium arming under equal sacrifice is no greater than that under
both are possible, the two agents in their negotiations would presumably communicate and coordinate their
actions. Put differently, the arming equilibrium in such cases is not perfectly coalition-proof, and thus can be
ruled out in favor of the no-arming equilibrium. See Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2017b) for further discussion
of this point.
19In particular, since arming induced by the split-the-surplus rule of division is greater than that induced
by the other rules of division, one need only confirm that Gss > Gc or equivalently (using the solution
for Gss > 0 shown in Proposition 2 and the solution for Gc implied by (7) in the case of symmetry) that
1 < 2
1
σ−1 , which holds for σ ∈ (1,∞).
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split-the-surplus (i.e., Ges ≤ Gss), is similar to their ranking. Nonetheless, there are two
important differences. First, in the setting of that paper with no trade, the ideal payoffs
are always sensitive to the threat-point payoffs, while in setting of this paper where there
is trade, they need not be—namely, under the equal sacrifice protocol when σ < 2. As
such, we find in contrast to Anbarci et al. (2002) that, depending on the magnitude of the
possible gains from trade, the rule of division that follows from the equal sacrifice bargaining
solution can support unarmed peace. Second, depending on the potential gains from trade,
the marginal benefit from arming for agent i, under the rule of division that follows from the
split-the-surplus solution given Gj = 0, can fall short of the marginal cost. More precisely
and in contrast to Anbarci et al. (2002), we find that, when σ ∈ (32 , 2), the split-the-surplus
protocol can also support unarmed peace.20
Propositions 1 and 2 show how equilibrium arming compares across the three solution
concepts. The next step is to compare the associated payoffs. Let Vh be the representative
agent’s payoff when Gi = Gh (i = 1, 2 and h ∈ {ss, es, nb}). It is easy to see that Vh =
2
1
σ−1 (R−Gh), which is linearly decreasing in Gh, as indicated by the downward sloping
line in Fig. 3. Then, the next proposition follows readily from Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 (Payoff Comparisons.) Under assumption (S), the equal sacrifice solution
weakly dominates the split-the-surplus and Nash bargaining solutions. Furthermore, the
Nash bargaining solution dominates the split-the-surplus solutions in equilibria that involve
positive quantities of guns. However, this ranking is reversed when the no arming equilib-
rium under the split-the-surplus solution is considered. More specifically, the equilibrium
payoffs associated with the bargaining solutions h ∈ {ss, es, nb} can be compared as follows:
(a) If σ ∈ (1, 112), then Ves > Vnb > Vss.
(b) If σ ∈ (112 , 2], then Ves = Vss > Vnb for Gss = 0, while Ves > Vnb > Vss for Gss > 0.
(c) If σ ∈ (2,∞), then Ves > Vnb > Vss.
Proposition 3 as well as Proposition 2 are illustrated in Fig. 3.
Finally, the reader might wonder whether any or all of the equilibria under peaceful
settlement based on these division rules are stable. The next proposition addresses this
issue.
20Note that the Kalai-Smorodinsky (ks) solution is defined implicitly by the condition Φ
(
λiks
)
= Ψ
(
λiks
)
.
Although we do not study this solution in detail here, we note that the impact of an agent’s guns on the
share of the contested resource under the ks solution is a weighted sum of the marginal effects of his guns
on the shares under the es and ss solutions; consequently, Ges < Gks < Gss for all σ ∈ (2,∞). In addition,
numerical analysis suggests that for all σ ∈ (1,∞) the ks solution implies a lower level of arming than the
nb solution.
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Proposition 4 (Stability of equilibrium.) The equilibria under each of the rules of division
h ∈ {ss, es, nb} are immune to unilateral deviations.
The argument here is rather intuitive, and starts with the observation that, for any feasible
arming by the two agents Gi and Gj (not necessarily equal), the payoff for each agent un-
der war is less than the payoff under settlement (and thus trade): ui(Gi, Gj) < vih(G
i, Gj)
for i 6= j = 1, 2, where we now denote agent i’s payoff under war given Gi and Gj per
unit of X¯ by ui(Gi, Gj) = φi(Gi, Gj) and agent i’s payoff under settlement with divi-
sion rule h conditional again on Gi and Gj per unit of X¯ by vih(G
i, Gj). But, if that
inequality holds for any feasible pair (Gi, Gj), then it will surely hold for (Bic(G
j
h), G
j
h),
where Bic(G
j
h) indicates agent i’s best reply to the rival’s choice, shown in (7), evaluated
at Gj = Gjh: u
i(Bic(G
j
h), G
j
h) < v
i
h(B
i
c(G
j
h), G
j
h). That is to say, even if agent i were to
anticipate choosing war and arm accordingly given agent j’s arming choice in anticipation
of settlement, agent i would be better off choosing settlement over war. But, if agent i
anticipates choosing settlement, he would adjust his guns in anticipation of settlement,
implying vih(B
i
c(G
j
h), G
j
h) < v
i
h(G
i
h, G
j
h). Thus, unilateral deviations from the settlement
outcome under rule h that would trigger a war cannot be profitable. Notice that this argu-
ment does not require we impose the assumption of symmetry. Perhaps more importantly,
this line of reasoning implies that war cannot emerge as an equilibrium outcome in the
one-period setting of this paper. In particular, even if either one or both agents were to
arm in anticipation of war, neither would have an incentive to declare war.
4 Concluding Remarks
The idea that the presence of trade opportunities and the potential gains they imply for
participating countries can help promote global peace is by no means new. Indeed, we
have shown that, in the setting of our model despite its abstraction from war’s destructive
effects, countries will always prefer a peaceful division of the productive resource followed
by mutually beneficial trade over a winner-take-all contest (i.e., war) that precludes trade.
But, going beyond that intuitive idea, this paper explores how different rules of division
that follow from a variety of bargaining solutions rank in terms of their efficiency. One
key result here, as in Anbarci et al. (2002) who do not consider trade, is that the ranking
depends on how sensitive the rules of division are to arming through their influence on the
disagreement payoffs (or the payoffs obtained under war). The greater is that sensitivity or
the weaker are norms against threats, the greater are the incentives to arm under peaceful
settlement, leaving fewer resources left over for production.
Building on that idea and extending Anbarci et al. (2002), our analysis shows further
that the ranking of the sensitivity of these rules depends on the gains from trade. When the
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gains are sufficiently large, then either the rule based on the equal sacrifice solution or the
rule based on the split-the-surplus solution can support unarmed peace that would domi-
nate the rule based on Nash bargaining that generates strictly positive equilibrium arming.
Otherwise, each of the rules considered imply arming in equilibrium, and in this case the
rule based on the equal sacrifice solution, which is least sensitive to the disagreement payoffs
and thus implies the strongest norms against threats, emerges as the Pareto dominant rule.
Since our analysis is based on a very simple setting, it is natural for one to ask how the
efficiency rankings extend to more general settings. Consider, for example, our assumption
that initial resources are symmetrically distributed across the two agents. It turns out
that this assumption is important only insofar as it allows us to abstract from outcomes
where one of the two agents is resource constrained in the production of guns. That is to
say, the equilibria in guns under peaceful settlement based on any of the rules of division
considered as well as the equilibrium under war remain symmetric provided the resource
constraint does not bind for either of the agents in his production of guns. As such, the
efficiency ranking of the rules of division under settlement found above remain intact. Even
when one agent is resource constrained under war, the finding that incentives to arm under
peaceful settlement are lower than under war means that it is possible neither agent is
resource constrained under settlement, in which case the efficiency rankings would continue
to hold. Of course, if the initial distribution of the resource is sufficiently uneven, one of the
agents could be resource constrained under one or more of the rules of division for peaceful
settlement as well as under war.21 The implications for the efficiency ranking of the rules of
division under settlement are not immediately obvious.22 Still, settlement would continue
to dominate war for both agents since it involves less arming for the unconstrained agent;
and, by our arguments above, war could not emerge in the one-period setting analyzed here.
This result would seem to form a strong basis for the classical liberal view. However,
we caution the reader that it need not hold generally in a multi-period setting, under the
reasonable assumption that commitments to the division of the resource in the future are
not feasible. In particular, even if the two sides settle their dispute in the current pe-
riod peacefully, they would have to negotiate a division of the resource in the future and
that possibly requires additional arming.23 War, by contrast, could confer on the winner
a strategic advantage in future disputes over the resource. One extreme possibility here,
21Given the ranking of the incentives for agents to arm under ss, nb and es (assuming σ > 2), successive
shifts in the initial distribution of resources away from one agent and towards the other would render the
resource constraint binding (for one country) more quickly under ss, then nb and finally under es.
22Interestingly, numerical analysis indicates that, if one agent i is sufficiently larger such that agent j is
resource constrained under each of the bargaining solutions, agent j’s preference ordering over the three rules
remains intact; by contrast, the unconstrained agent could prefer splitting the surplus to Nash bargaining
and prefer Nash bargaining to equal sacrifice. Thus, it is possible that no rule is Pareto efficient.
23See Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006), as well as Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and McBride and
Skaperdas (2014) for discussions on this point.
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studied by Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2017b) while focusing on the split-the-surplus rule, is
that victory in a war effectively wipes out the rival and thus eliminates the victor’s need to
arm in the future. In that dynamic setting, depending on the magnitude of the gains from
trade, the destructiveness of war and the salience of the future, among other factors, war
could emerge as the perfectly coalition-proof equilibrium. While under other parameteri-
zations of the model peaceful settlement could Pareto dominate war, the arguments of the
present paper in a one-period setting that rule out the profitability of unilateral deviations
do not easily carry over to the multi-period setting. Nevertheless, results of the present
paper suggest that the other bargaining protocols (namely, equal sacrifice and Nash bar-
gaining) could be more conducive to peaceful settlement than the split-the-surplus solution
in a multi-period setting.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Part (a): Setting λi = 1/2 and λi = 1 in (4) gives vi(12) = 2
−σ−2
σ−1 and
vi (1) = 1, respectively. The result then follows by comparing these payoffs. In particular,
if σ = 2, then vi(12) = 1 = v
i(1). In contrast, if σ < 2 (resp., σ > 2), then vi(12) > 1 (resp.,
vi(12) < 1).
Part (b): First note that differentiation of vi with respect to λi (while, at the same time,
allowing λj to change since λj = 1− λi) gives
viλi ≡
1
σviλiλj
σλj − (λj)σ−1σ
(λi)
σ−1
σ + (λj)
σ−1
σ
 . (A.1)
Now define ρ ≡ λi/λj . Since λi + λj = 1, we have λi = ρ/ (1 + ρ) and λj = 1/(1 + ρ). Next
observe that the (implicit) solutions to vi
λi
= 0 and vj−uj = 0 give λiT and ˜˜λi, respectively.
We may rewrite these conditions so that, in the former case, we have:
1
1− λiT
= 1 + ρ = σ
(
1 + ρ
σ−1
σ
)
. (A.2)
Similarly, setting Gi = Gj = G (which implies uj = 12) and using the definition of v
j in the
vj − uj = 0 case we have
1
1− ˜˜λi = 1 + ρ = 2
(
1 + ρ
σ−1
σ
) 1
σ−1
. (A.3)
One can readily see now that both (A.2) and (A.3) have unique solutions in which ρ > 1.
Division of the expressions in the far right of (A.2) and (A.3) gives
2
σ
(
1 + ρ
σ−1
σ
)−σ−2
σ−1
.
Since the left-hand sides of (A.2) and (A.3) involve 1 + ρ, the relationship of the above
expression to 1 describes the relationship between λiT and
˜˜
λ
i
. It is now easy to verify that
σ T 2⇒ 1− λiT T 1− ˜˜λi or, equivalently, σ T 2⇒ λiT S ˜˜λi. ||
Proof of Lemma 2: To find the impact of an agent’s arming on his share of the disputed
resource, first we differentiate the equations in (11) to obtain:
Φλi = −
Φvi
λi
+ vj
λj
vi − ui and ΦGi =
Φui
Gi
− uj
Gi
vi − ui (A.4a)
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Ψλi =
Ψvi
λi
+ vj
λj
wi − vi and ΨGi = −
Ψwi
Gi
− wj
Gi
wi − vi (A.4b)
Ωλi =
−Ωvi
λiλi
+ vj
λjλj
vi
λi
. (A.4c)
Differentiating the equations in (12) and using the implicit function theorem yield:
∂λiss/∂G
i = −ΦGi
Φλi
=
Φui
Gi
− uj
Gi
Φvi
λi
+ vj
λj
(A.5a)
∂λies/∂G
i = −ΨGi
Ψλi
=
Ψwi
Gi
− wj
Gi
Ψvi
λi
+ vj
λj
(A.5b)
∂λinb/∂G
i = − ΦGi
Φλi + Ωλi
=
Φui
Gi
− uj
Gi
Φvi
λi
+ vj
λj
− (vi − ui)
(
−Ωvi
λiλi
+vj
λjλj
vi
λi
) . (A.5c)
Since the signs and magnitudes of the expressions in (A.4) play key roles in the determi-
nation of ∂λih/∂G
i shown in (A.5), it pays to investigate them now. First, recalling that
ui ≡ φi (i = 1, 2) and using (5), we have ui
Gi
= φi
Gi
> 0 and uj
Gi
= −φi
Gi
< 0 as well
as vi > ui, which from (A.4a) imply ΦGi > 0. Second, we have v
i
λi
> 0 for λi ∈ [12 , λiT )
(i = 1, 2). As such, under assumption (S) which implies λi = λj = 12 , v
i
λi
> 0 holds in
equilibrium. Then, it follows from (A.4a) that Φλi |λi=1/2 < 0 and, thus, from (A.5a), that
∂λiss/∂G
i > 0 holds.
The above discussion also sheds light on the sign of ∂λinb/∂G
i and its ranking relative
to ∂λiss/∂G
i. As noted in the text and as can be confirmed by differentiating vi
λi
in (A.1)
to find
viλiλi = −
1
vi

(
λj
)−σ+1
σ
[(
λi
)σ−1
σ + (σ − 1) (λj)σ−1σ ]
(λi)2 σ2
[
(λi)
σ−1
σ + (λj)
σ−1
σ
]2
 < 0, (A.6)
vi is strictly concave in λi for both players provided σ > 1. In addition, from (11c) and
the definition of λiT , one can then see Ω ≡ Ω(λi) < 0 for λi ∈ [12 , λiT ). Thus, the last term
in the denominator of the far right expression in (A.5c) is positive. This point and the
analysis in the previous paragraph imply ∂λiss/∂G
i > ∂λinb/∂G
i > 0, the last inequality
shown in Lemma 2. In words, the concavity of payoff functions in shares (which enters the
determination of distributive shares under nb but not under ss) renders λinb less sensitive
to changes in guns than λiss under the conditions of the lemma.
Turning to ∂λies/∂G
i, the definition of the ideal payoffs in (10) reveals that changes
in arming will influence these payoffs only in cases where wi = vi(
˜˜
λ
i
) (which as discussed
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earlier depends on the value of σ, an inverse proxy of the gains from trade). Focusing on this
case, (8) implies wi
Gi
= ˜˜viλi(∂˜˜λi/∂Gi) = −˜˜viλi(∂λ˜j/∂Gi) since ˜˜λi = 1 − λ˜j , for i 6= j = 1, 2.
Equation (8) with assumption (S) further implies ∂λ˜j/∂Gi = uj
Gi
/v˜j
λj
. Repeating this
argument for changes in wj gives
wiGi =
˜˜viλi
v˜j
λj
(
−uj
Gi
)
(A.7a)
wj
Gi
=
˜˜vjλj
v˜i
λi
(−uiGi) . (A.7b)
Thus, provided λi ∈ [12 , λiT ) for both players, wiGi > 0 and wjGi < 0 hold. To proceed
further, we must make more intensive use of our symmetry assumption. Accordingly, we
focus on the case of equal arming (i.e., Gi = G for i = 1, 2), which implies, among other
things, uj
Gi
= −ui
Gi
, vj
λj
= vi
λi
, vj
λjλj
= vi
λiλi
and enables us to rewrite ˜˜viλi/v˜jλj = ˜˜vjλj/v˜iλi
as ˜˜viλi/v˜iλi (since v˜jλj = v˜iλi). But, the strict concavity of vi in λi implies ˜˜viλi/v˜iλi < 1; thus,
wi
Gi
= −wj
Gi
< ui
Gi
. Since as can easily be confirmed Φ = Ψ = −Ω = 1 under symmetry, a
comparison of (A.5a) and (A.5b) shows that ∂λiss/∂G
i > ∂λies/∂G
i > 0. Thus, the division
under es is less sensitive than division under ss to an agent’s arming, due to the indirect
(and weaker) dependence of the ideal payoffs on the threat point.
What we do not know yet is how ∂λies/∂G
i compares with ∂λinb/∂G
i. Such a comparison
requires a considerable amount of additional work. Applying the implications of symmetry
to (A.5b) and (A.5c), we can rewrite these expressions, after simplification, as
∂λies/∂G
i =
(˜˜viλi/v˜jλj)uiGi
vi
λi
=
ui
Gi
/vi
λi
v˜j
λj
/˜˜viλi (A.8)
∂λinb/∂G
i =
ui
Gi
vi
λi
− (vi − ui) (vi
λiλi
/vi
λi
) = uiGi/viλi
1− (1− ui/vi) [vivi
λiλi
/(vi
λi
)2
] . (A.9)
Note that v˜j
λj
/˜˜viλi is the slope of the PPF at wi—or, in the context of Fig. 2(b), the slope
of the PPF at point E (but with G1 = G2) or at point E in Fig. 1.
Now, using the transformations λi = ρ/(1 + ρ) and λj = 1/ (1 + ρ) in the definitions of
v˜j
λj
and ˜˜viλi we may rewrite v˜jλj/˜˜viλi in (A.8) as
v˜j
λj
/˜˜viλi = ρ
1
σ−1σ − 1+ρ
1+ρ
σ−1
σ
σ − 1+ρ
1+ρ
σ−1
σ
> 1, since ρ > 1 at vj − uj = 0.
Turning to (A.9), ui/vi = 2−
1
σ−1 (since ui = 1/2 and vi = 2−
σ−2
σ−1 ) and −vivi
λiλi
/(vi
λi
)2 =
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σ/ (σ − 1)2 in the denominator. Upon substitution of these expressions in (A.8) and A.9),
we arrive at
Λ (ρ, σ) ≡ ∂λ
i
es/∂G
i
∂λinb/∂G
i
=
 σ − 1+ρ1+ρσ−1σ
ρ
1
σ−1σ − 1+ρ
1+ρ
σ−1
σ

1 + σ
(
1− 2− 1σ−1
)
(σ − 1)2
 > 0. (A.10)
Since the expression inside the first set of brackets is smaller than 1 while the expression
in the second set of brackets is larger than 1, it is unclear how es and nb compare in the
sensitivities of the shares they give rise to. Nevertheless, we can resolve this ambiguity
constructively, with the use of numerical methods that exhaust all possibilities.
To this end, note from (A.3), that the value of ρ that solves vj − uj = 0 coincides with
the solution to 1 + ρ = 2(1 + ρ
σ−1
σ )
1
σ−1 . Denote this solution as ρ0 (σ). It is straightforward
to show that ρ0 is unique and that dρ0/dσ < 0. We calculated ρ0 (σ) for values of σ ∈
(2, 1000) using a grid of 0.001. The calculations relied on Newton’s method. Substituting
each value of ρ0 into Λ (·) and evaluating the resulting expression confirms that, indeed,
Λ (ρ0 (σ) , σ) < 1 for all relevant values of σ. In short, ∂λ
i
nb/∂G
i > ∂λies/∂G
i > 0, which
completes the proof. ||
Proof of Proposition 1: With our maintained focus on symmetric equilibria that imply
λih = 1/2 for all h, we derive the following expressions for the relevant terms appearing in
(13): vi = 2−
σ−2
σ−1 , vi
λi
= 2
1
σ−1 (σ−1)
σ , and X¯ = 2(R −G). Substituting these relationships in
(13) and simplifying the resulting expression gives
∂V ih
∂Gi
= 2−
σ−2
σ−1
[
4 (σ − 1) (R−G)
σ
(
∂λih
∂Gi
)
− 1
]
. (A.11)
The above expression makes two things clear. First, a corner solution with Gh = 0 arises if
∂λih/∂G
i = 0. The intuition for this result is that, if an increase in an agent’s arming does
not raise his share of the contested resource, then his marginal benefit will vanish and it
would be pointless to incur the cost of producing any guns. Second, if ∂λih/∂G
i > 0, then
the marginal benefit of producing guns will be positive and, as long as this benefit is not
dominated by the associated marginal cost, a positive quantity of arms will be observed.
What’s more, because an agent’s marginal benefit is increasing in the sensitivity of his share
to his arming, the bargaining solutions can be ranked in terms of their relative sensitivities.
Noting that there is no closed-form solution to ∂λies/∂G
i when ∂λies/∂G
i > 0, we apply
the implications of symmetry to ∂λih/∂G
i in (A.5) for h ∈ {ss, nb} using (A.4) to obtain
∂λiss/∂G
i =
1
4G
[
2
1
σ−1
(σ − 1)
σ
]−1
=
1
4GA
> 0
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∂λinb/∂G
i =
1
4G
[
2
1
σ−1
(σ − 1)
σ
+
2
1
σ−1 − 1
σ − 1
]−1
=
1
4G (A+B)
> 0,
where A ≡ 2 1σ−1 (σ−1)σ and B ≡ 2
1
σ−1−1
σ−1 , as defined in the proposition. Substituting the
above expressions in (A.11) and solving for G gives the expressions for the unique Gss and
Gnb in the interior of the strategy space noted in the proposition.
Let us now take a closer look at each solution concept. Starting with ss, for space
reasons and as noted in the text, we just point out that technical details on the Gss = 0
case for σ ∈ [112 , 2] are contained Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2017b). The intuition was
explained in the text.
Turning to nb, the solution is always in the interior of the strategy space because an
agent always has an incentive to operate on the interior (and downward-sloping part) of the
PPF, which requires some arming.
Lastly, with regards to the es solution, we note that whether Ges is zero or positive
hinges on the possible dependence (or not) of the agents’ ideal payoffs on their disagreement
payoffs. But, as noted in Lemma 1(b), this dependence (or, its absence) hinges on whether
σ < 2 (or not). ||
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Figure 1:  Bargaining Sets and their Dependence on the Gains
                                        from Trade
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Figure 1: Bargaining Sets and their Dependence on the Gains from Trade
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Figure 2: Disagreement Payoffs, Ideal Payoffs and Division Rules
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Figure 2: Disagreement Payoffs, Ideal Payoffs and Division Rules
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Arming and Payoffs under Conflict, the Split-the-Surplus,         
                                   Equal Sacrifice and Nash Bargaining Solutions
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Arming and Payoffs under the Split-the-Surplus, Equal Sacrifice and
Nash Bargaining Solutions
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